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Abstract
We study the determinants of liquidity and price differentials between on-the-run and off-the-
run U.S. Treasury bond markets. To guide our analysis, we develop a parsimonious model
of multi-asset speculative trading in which endowment shocks separate the on-the-run security
from an otherwise identical off-the-run security. We then explore the equilibrium implications
of these shocks on both off/on-the-run price and liquidity differentials in the presence of two
realistic market frictions– information heterogeneity and imperfect competition among informed
traders – and a public signal. We test these implications by analyzing daily differences in
market liquidity and yields for on-the-run and off-the-run three-month, six-month, and one-year
U.S. Treasury bills and two-year, five-year, and ten-year U.S. Treasury notes. Our evidence
suggests that i) off/on-the-run bid-ask spread differentials are economically and statistically
significant, even after controlling for differences in several of the bonds’ intrinsic characteristics
(such as duration, convexity, or repo rates); ii) their corresponding yield differentials are neither,
inconsistent with the illiquidity premium hypothesis; and iii) off/on-the-run liquidity differentials
are larger for bonds of shorter maturity, immediately following bond auction dates, when the
uncertainty surrounding the ensuing auction allocations is high, when the dispersion of beliefs
across informed traders is high, and when macroeconomic announcements are noisy, consistent
with our stylized model.
JEL classification: E44; G14
Keywords: Treasury Bond Markets; Strategic Trading; Market Microstructure; Liquidity;
Order Flow; On-The-Run Bonds; Off-The-Run Bonds; Macroeconomic News Announcements;
Expectations; Dispersion of Beliefs
1 Introduction
The on-the-run phenomenon refers to the stylized fact that, in fixed income markets, securities
with nearly identical cash flows trade at different yields and with different liquidity. In particular,
most recently issued (i.e., on-the-run, new, or benchmark) government bonds of a certain maturity
are generally more expensive and liquid than previously issued (i.e., off-the-run or old) bonds
maturing on similar dates.
Ample evidence of this phenomenon has been reported both in the U.S. Treasury market (e.g.,
Amihud andMendelson, 1991; Kamara, 1994; Furfine and Remolona, 2002; Krishnamurthy, 2002;
Strebulaev, 2002; Fleming, 2003; Goldreich et al., 2005) and in other countries (e.g., for Japan,
Mason, 1987; Boudouck and Whitelaw, 1991, 1993). Accordingly, several explanations have also
been provided by practitioners and academics. The most popular one attributes the on-the-run
yield phenomenon to liquidity – the extent to which an asset can be traded cheaply, quickly,
and with limited price impact. The illiquidity premium hypothesis of Amihud and Mendelson
(1986) states that since investors value liquidity, more liquid securities should trade at a premium
over otherwise similar, yet less liquid ones. Most existing literature concentrates on testing this
prediction. Early studies find support for it (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson, 1991; Warga, 1992;
Kamara, 1994). However, more recent research suggests that, even in the presence of off/on-the-
run liquidity differentials, the corresponding yield differentials may be explained away by such
considerations as differing tax treatments (Strebulaev, 2002), specialness in the repo markets
(i.e., the cost of shorting, as in Duffie, 1996; Krishnamurthy, 2002), search costs (Vayanos and
Weill, 2005), or the value of future liquidity (Goldreich et al., 2005).
In spite of this debate on the relative importance of liquidity as a factor driving off/on-the-
run price differentials, there is little or no disagreement in the literature that off/on-the-run
liquidity differentials in fixed income markets are both economically and statistically relevant.
Nonetheless, we are aware of no theoretical and empirical study of the determinants of those
liquidity differentials.1 Performing such analysis is the objective of this paper.2 To that purpose,
1Amihud and Mendelson (1991) and Vayanos and Weill (2005) report anecdotal evidence that off-the-run bonds
are in smaller effective supply – hence less liquid – because they become locked away in institutional investors’
portfolios. Yet, since the econometrician does not observe when the off-the-run bonds become unavailable, their
explanation cannot be empirically tested. Barclay et al. (2006) show that the market share of electronic interme-
diaries drops significantly when Treasury securities go off-the-run. Electronic trading platforms were not available
during most of our sample period.
2A related literature studies price discrepancies among substantially identical securities or portfolios (e.g.,
Lee, Schleifer, and Thaler, 1990, 1991; Daves and Ehrhardt, 1993; Bodurtha, Kim, and Lee, 1995; Froot and
Dabora, 1999; Grinblatt and Longstaff, 2000). Many of these papers use liquidity differentials to explain observed
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we develop a parsimonious model of multi-asset trading. This model – in the spirit of Kyle
(1985), Foster and Viswanathan (1996), and Pasquariello and Vega (2006) – builds upon two
realistic market frictions: information heterogeneity and imperfect competition among informed
traders (henceforth, speculators). In this basic setting, more diverse information among specu-
lators makes their trading activity more cautious and market-makers more vulnerable to adverse
selection, thus leading to lower equilibrium market liquidity. Pasquariello and Vega (2006) find
strong empirical support for the main implications of this model in the U.S. Treasury market.3
By design, we use this setting to identify a novel mechanism explaining the on-the-run phe-
nomenon, rather than comprehensively allowing for the several alternative explanations men-
tioned above. Specifically, we explore the role of government auctions in discriminating among
two asset types of identical terminal payoff– off-the-run and on-the-run bonds – since by defi-
nition the latter are those most recently auctioned to sophisticated traders. In addition, although
the total amount sold by the government is known to all market participants, the individual al-
locations may not. We capture these features of government bond markets by further assuming
that each speculator receives a privately observed endowment in the latter asset type and cares
about the interim as well as the liquidation value of his portfolio.
In this amended setting, we show that i) equilibrium market liquidity in the on-the-run asset
is greater than in the off-the-run asset, the more so the greater the uncertainty about endowment
shocks. Intuitively, speculators deviate from their informationally optimal trading strategies in
the on-the-run asset to distort its interim price in the direction of their endowments. In these
circumstances, uninformed market-makers perceive the threat of adverse selection in that asset
as less serious, hence making its market more liquid. As interestingly, the equilibrium off/on-the
run liquidity spread is sensitive to the information environment in which trading takes place.
In particular, we find that ii) such spread is generally lower the more correlated is speculators’
private fundamental information, for that attenuates their incentives to trade cautiously with it
in both markets yet alleviates adverse selection the most where the latter is most severe (i.e., in
the off-the-run market). Consistently, we also show that iii) the equilibrium off/on-the-run price
spread is driven exclusively by noise trading and endowment shocks but that, ceteris paribus, iv)
both price and liquidity spreads are decreased by the availability of public fundamental news –
a trade-free source of information – reducing the adverse selection risk for the market-makers,
the more so the greater that signal’s precision.
The contribution of the model is twofold. Other papers have studied the properties of a
mispricings, yet none examines directly the determinants of those differentials.
3Consistently, Sadka and Scherbina (2006) find a positive relationship between analyst disagreement and both
the permanent price impact of trades and the effective percentage bid-ask spread in the U.S. equity market.
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financial market in which strategic traders receive privately observable endowment shocks, most
notably Bhattacharyya and Nanda (1999) and Vayanos (1999, 2001). Yet, to our knowledge,
our model is the first to relate the on-the-run phenomenon to auction-driven endowment shocks.
Furthermore, our model is the first to generate explicit and empirically testable implications on
the impact of both the heterogeneity of private signals and the presence and quality of public
signals on the nature of that relationship.
Our empirical results strongly support the main implications of our model. We start by
providing evidence of a systematic decoupling of the on-the-run liquidity phenomenon from the
on-the-run yield phenomenon in the U.S. Treasury market. Specifically, we show that off/on-
the-run bid-ask spread differentials for three-month, six-month, and one-year Treasury bills, and
two-year, five-year, and ten-year Treasury notes are positive, economically significant – aver-
aging more than half of the corresponding mean off-the-run spread – and cannot be explained
by differences in such fundamental characteristics of the underlying securities as modified dura-
tion and convexity. Off/on-the-run yield differentials are instead neither uniformly positive nor
uniformly significant, inconsistent with the illiquidity premium hypothesis.4
Our analysis suggests that those off/on-the-run liquidity differentials are affected by uncer-
tainty about speculators’ endowments in the on-the-run securities, consistent with our model.
For instance, we find that those differentials are greater for bills than notes, as well as increas-
ing in the notes’ maturity, for speculators are likely to be less sensitive to fluctuations in the
interim value of portfolios of the latter. In addition, we show that in the days immediately
following Treasury “new bond” auctions – when on-the-run endowment uncertainty is arguably
the highest – off/on-the-run bid-ask spread differentials decline, often significantly so, while the
corresponding yield differentials either widen or are unchanged, even after controlling for relative
duration, convexity, repo specialness, and supply effects. Accordingly, we also find that off/on-
the-run liquidity differentials are positively related to the competitive yield range (high minus
low divided by average auction bid yield), a more direct proxy for auction-driven endowment
uncertainty.
Further investigation reveals that the magnitude and dynamics of these spread differentials
are also crucially related to the informational role of trading in the U.S. Treasury market, again
consistent with our model. In particular, we find that off/on-the-run liquidity differentials are
positively related to perceived, market-wide uncertainty surrounding U.S. monetary policy –
4Accordingly, Krishnamurthy (2002) shows that yield differentials between old and new thirty-year Treasury
bonds are too small to make convergence trades profitable when accounting for the corresponding repo rate
differentials; Strebulaev (2002) finds no significant price difference between Treasury notes maturing on the same
day.
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measured by Eurodollar implied volatility– and to the degree of information heterogeneity about
U.S. macroeconomic fundamentals among market participants – measured by the standard
deviation of professional forecasts of macroeconomic news releases (as in Pasquariello and Vega,
2006) – albeit more weakly so. Correspondingly, we show that the availability of macroeconomic
news – a trade-free source of information about assets’ payoffs attenuating adverse selection
among market participants – lowers both off/on-the-run yield and spread differentials, the
more so when those signals are less noisy and/or when speculators’ private information is more
heterogeneous.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we construct a stylized model of trading to guide our
empirical analysis. In Section 3, we describe the data. In Section 4, we present the empirical
results. We conclude in Section 5.
2 A Model of the On-The-Run Phenomenon
In this section we motivate our investigation of the process of price formation in on-the-run and
off-the-run Treasury bond markets. We do so by studying the impact of endowment shocks on the
informational role of trading in the presence of dispersion of beliefs among sophisticated market
participants and macroeconomic news. Specifically, we first describe a parsimonious model of
trading in both securities in the spirit of Foster and Viswanathan (1996) and Pasquariello and
Vega (2006), and derive a closed-form solution for the equilibrium depth differential between the
two markets. Then, we enrich the model by introducing a public signal and consider its implica-
tions for the market equilibrium. We test for the empirical relevance and economic significance
of our argument in the next section. All proofs are in the Appendix unless otherwise noted.
2.1 The Basic Model
The basic model is a three-date, two-period economy in which two identical risky assets (i = 1, 2)
are exchanged. Trading occurs only at the end of the first period (t = 1). At the end of the
second period (t = 2), the identical payoff of the risky assets – a normally distributed random
variable v with mean p0 and variance σ2v – is realized. The economy is populated by three types
of risk-neutral traders: a discrete number (M) of informed traders (that we label speculators),
liquidity traders, and perfectly competitive market-makers (MMs) in each asset i. All traders
know the structure of the economy and the decision process leading to order flow and prices. At
time t = 0 there is no information asymmetry about v, and the price of both risky assets is p0.
In fixed income markets, just-issued, on-the-run government bonds (e.g., asset 2) routinely
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trade at different prices and with different liquidity than previously issued, off-the-run bonds
with (almost) identical cash flows (e.g., asset 1). In this section, we propose a theory of this
puzzling phenomenon which focuses on the crucial role of government auctions in discriminating
among these assets. Indeed, by definition, on-the-run bonds are so by having been most recently
auctioned to sophisticated traders in a primary market. Interestingly, although the total amount
sold by the government is known to all market participants, the individual allocations may
not. We capture this feature of government bond markets by assuming that, at time t = 0,
each speculator k receives an initial endowment of risky asset 2 whose magnitude ek2 – a
normally distributed random variable with mean zero and variance σ2e – is known exclusively
to him. Because of this assumption, we label asset 2 the on-the-run security in our setting. For
simplicity, we also assume that each endowment is unrelated to any other (cov (ek2, ej2) = 0) and
uninformative about v (cov (ek2, v) = 0), hence so is each speculator’s initial wealthW0k = ek2p0.5
Sometime between t = 0 and t = 1, each speculator k also receives a private and noisy
signal of v, Svk. We assume that each signal Svk is drawn from a normal distribution with
mean p0 and variance σ2s and that, for any two Svk and Svj, cov (v, Svk) = cov (Svk, Svj) = σ
2
v
and cov (ek2, Svk) = cov (ek2, Svj) = 0. These assumptions imply that E (v|Svk) − p0 = δvk =
ρ (Svk − p0), where ρ = σ2vσ2s is the correlation between any two information endowments δvk and
δvj. We parametrize the degree of diversity among speculators’ signals by imposing that σ2s =
σ2v
ρ
and ρ ∈ (0, 1]. If ρ = 1, speculators’ private information is homogeneous, i.e., all speculators
receive the same signal Svk = Sv. If ρ < 1, speculators’ information is heterogeneous, i.e., less
than perfectly correlated, the more so the lower is ρ.
2.1.1 Market Participants and Trading
At time t = 1, both speculators and liquidity traders submit their orders in assets 1 and 2
to the MMs, before these assets’ equilibrium prices p11 and p12 have been set. We define the
market order of speculator k in asset i to be xki. Liquidity traders generate random, normally
distributed demands z1 and z2, with mean zero and variance σ2z. For simplicity, we assume that
z1 and z2 are identical (z1 = z2 = z) and independent from all other random variables. By the
same token, we also impose that MMs in each asset i do not receive any information about its
terminal payoff v, but observe only that asset’s aggregate order flow ω1i =
PM
k=1 xki+ z from all
market participants before setting the market-clearing price p1i = p1i (ω1i), as in Subrahmanyam
5Vayanos (2001) studies the strategic trading activity of a risk-averse speculator endowed with a privately
observed inventory but no private information about payoffs. Similar, yet more involved results ensue if
cov (ek2, v) 6= 0.
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(1991). This latter assumption can be relaxed to allow for the MMs to observe the aggregate
order flow for all securities (as in Pasquariello, 2003) if their terminal payoffs are similar yet not
identical. The ensuing setting, albeit more complex, yields similar equilibrium implications.
In Kyle (1985) and Pasquariello and Vega (2006), speculators are risk-neutral, hence indiffer-
ent to their intermediate wealth and endowment of risky assets. However, we intend to explore
the impact of specific endowment shocks on the process of price formation of otherwise identical
assets. To that purpose, we further assume that our speculators, albeit risk-neutral, care about
the interim as well as the terminal value of their portfolios. Specifically, we assume that each
speculator’s optimal demands xk1 and xk2 maximize the expected value of the following separable
utility function Uk of his wealth at t = 1 and t = 2:
Uk = γW1k + (1− γ)W2k, (1)
where γ ∈ [0, 1], W1k = W0k + ek2 (p12 − p0), and W2k = W0k + ek2 (v − p0) + xk1 (v − p11) +
xk2 (v − p12). W1k is known at the end of the first period, after the MMs set p11 and p12, while
W2k is known at the end of the second period, after v is realized. We interpret the ratio
γ
1−γ
as their intertemporal marginal rate of substitution between short and long-term wealth. If
γ = 0, each speculator k reduces to a (long-term) profit-maximizing trader, as in Kyle (1985)
and Pasquariello and Vega (2006). If γ > 0, his expected utility at t = 1, before trading occurs,
is given by











Ek1 (v)− Ek1 (p12)
¤ª
. (2)
At both dates t = 1 and t = 2 the change in wealth with respect to W0k depends on two
components: the change in value of the existing endowment of asset 2 and the profits from trading
in both assets 1 and 2 at t = 1. However, because the MMs set p11 and p12 after having observed
the order flow, the value of the net position accumulated at t = 1 is equal to zero in W1k. This
objective function, introduced by Bhattacharya and Nanda (1999) in a single-security framework,
can be motivated by wealth constraints, solvency issues, agency and reputation problems, or cash
redemptions and injections affecting the interim life of sophisticated market participants such as
(open-end) mutual funds.
2.1.2 Equilibrium
Consistently with Kyle (1985), we define a Bayesian Nash equilibrium as a set of 2 (M + 1)
functions x1i (·) , . . . , xMi (·), and p1i (·) such that the following two conditions hold:
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1. Profit maximization: xki (δvk, ek2) = argmaxEk1 (Uk);
2. Semi-strong market efficiency: p1i = E (v|ω1i).
We restrict our attention to linear equilibria. We first conjecture general linear functions
for the pricing rule and speculators’ demands. We then solve for their parameters satisfying
conditions 1 and 2. Finally, we show that these parameters and those functions represent a
rational expectations equilibrium. The following proposition accomplishes this task.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique linear equilibrium given by the price functions
p11 = p0 + λ1ω11 (3)
p12 = p0 + λ2ω12 (4)












1− γ ek2 (6)
















In equilibrium, each speculator, albeit risk-neutral, exploits his private information cautiously
(|xki| <∞) and in both assets to limit dissipating his informational advantage with his trades.
Both optimal trading strategies xki depend on his information endowment about the asset payoff
(δvk) and on the corresponding market’s depth (λ
−1
i ), as in Kyle, (1985). Further, as in Pasquar-
iello and Vega (2006), both xk1 (Eq. (5)) and xk2 (Eq. (6)) depend on the number of speculators
(M) and the correlation among their information endowments (ρ). Intuitively, the intensity of
competition among speculators affects their ability to maintain the informativeness of the order
flow as low as possible. A greater number of speculators trade more aggressively – i.e., their
aggregate amount of trading is higher – since (imperfect) competition among them precludes
any collusive trading strategy. The heterogeneity of speculators’ signals attenuates their trading
aggressiveness. When information is less correlated (ρ closer to zero), each speculator has some
monopoly power on his signal, because at least part of it is known exclusively to him. Hence,
each speculator trades more cautiously – i.e., his market order is lower – to reveal less of his
own information endowment δvk. Thus, either higher M or ρ leads to higher equilibrium liquid-
ity in both markets, i.e., lower λ1 and λ2. This reflects MMs’ attempt to be compensated for




In the equilibrium of Proposition 1, only the market for asset 2 is affected by the presence of
speculators’ endowments of that asset and only when their interim wealth (W1k) is relevant in
their objective function (γ > 0). When γ = 0, the market equilibrium is the same in both
markets: p11 = p12, λ1 = λ2, and xk1 = xk2 = σz√Mρσv δvk of Eq. (5) is the optimal informational
demand schedule of Kyle (1985) and Pasquariello and Vega (2006). When γ > 0, the latter is
true only in the off-the-run market (asset 1), while the optimal trades in the on-the-run security
(xk2) also depend on speculators’ endowments. This stems from the resolution of a trade-off
between short and long-term profits: Each speculator trades in the on-the-run asset more (or
less) than in the off-the run asset – i.e., more (or less) than he otherwise would if γ = 0 – to
distort prices in the direction of his endowment ek2 and so increaseW1k, regardless of his private
signal.
In equilibrium, these efforts are successful and create a wedge between off-the-run and on-the
run asset prices,
∆p1 = p11 − p12 =
√
Mρσv













yet at the cost of smaller expected long-term profits (since xk2 6= xk1).6 The expected price
differential ∆p1 is zero by construction since E (ek2) = E (z) = 0.7 Yet, its realizations may be
either positive or negative depending on those for
PM
k=1 ek2 and z.
Remark 1 The off/on-the run price differential can be either positive or negative. Its magnitude
depends on realized noise trading and endowment shocks but not on realized private information
shocks.
Further, in these circumstances, a portion of speculators’ trades xk2 is uninformative about
fundamentals (v). Hence, the MMs perceive the threat of adverse selection in the market for
asset 2 as less serious than in the market for asset 1, so penalize less their counterparts in the
former by making it more liquid than the latter:
∆λ = λ1 − λ2 =
√
Mρσv (σn − σz)
σzσn [2 + (M − 1) ρ] > 0 (8)







e is positive and identical to the expected short-term change in the value
of that speculator’s endowment E [ek2 (p12 − p0)].




v, i.e., speculators’ endowment-
motivated trading in asset 2 (γ > 0) does not affect the relative informativeness of that market. Intuitively,
more uninformative trading in asset 2 increases informed trading aggressiveness in that market, hence does not
destabilize its equilibrium price, as in Kyle (1985).
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since σ2z < σ
2
n. Accordingly, the greater γ and σe, the greater is the perceived intensity of
uninformative trading in the aggregate order flow for asset 2 (i.e., the greater is σ2n), the less
severe is adverse selection for the MMs in that market, thus the greater is the liquidity differential
between asset 1 and asset 2. Similarly, greater ex ante uncertainty about both assets’ common
terminal value v (σ2v) makes speculators’ private information about it more valuable and adverse
selection for the MMs in both markets more severe, yet the less so in the market for asset 2 (where
uninformative trading is more intense: σ2n > σ
2
z), thus increasing their liquidity differential. The
following corollary summarizes the first set of empirical implications of our model.
Corollary 1 Equilibrium market liquidity in the on-the-run asset is greater than in the off-the-
run asset, the more so the greater the relevance of and uncertainty about endowment shocks and
the greater the uncertainty about both assets’ common fundamentals.
To gain further insight on the liquidity differential between on-the-run and off-the-run secu-
rities, we construct a simple numerical example by setting σv = σz = σe = 1 and γ = 0.5. We
then vary the private signal correlation ρ to study the impact of different degrees of information
heterogeneity on the liquidity differential between asset 2 and asset 1 when M = 2, 4, 8, and
200.8 We plot the resulting ∆λ in Figure 1A. In the presence of numerous speculators (high
M), the plot for ∆λ is negatively sloped. Intuitively, more homogeneous private signals (higher
ρ) attenuate their incentives to behave cautiously when trading. This leads to greater market
liquidity in both asset markets, yet the more so in the market for the off-the-run security, where
adverse selection is the most severe. Hence, the liquidity differential decreases. However, in
the presence of few – thus already less competitive – speculators (low M), the plot for ∆λ is
instead positively sloped. Specifically, the equilibrium liquidity differential is lower when those
speculators are heterogeneously informed (low ρ), since their marginally more cautious use of
private information has a smaller impact on their trading activity in the off-the-run market than
in the on-the-run market. The following remark formalizes this result.
Remark 2 In the presence of many (few) speculators, the off/on-the-run liquidity differential is
generally increasing (decreasing) in the heterogeneity of their private signals.
2.2 Extension: A Public Signal
The basic model of Section 2.1 identifies a novel explanation for the on-the-run phenomenon
that relies on the uncertainty surrounding auction outcomes for just-issued securities. Within





this setting, we relate the magnitude of the liquidity differential between cash-flow-equivalent
assets to the heterogeneity of sophisticated speculators’ private signals (and resulting trading
activity). To our knowledge, this analysis is novel to the literature. In this section, we investigate
the impact of public disclosure on the on-the-run phenomenon. Many recent studies investigate
the functioning of government bond markets in proximity of the release of macroeconomic news
(e.g., Brandt and Kavajecz, 2004; Green, 2004; Pasquariello and Vega, 2006). Yet, the impact
of the availability of public signals on the relation between on-the-run and off-the-run securities
has never been previously explored.
To that purpose, we extend the basic economy by providing each player with an additional,
common source of information about the liquidation value of assets 1 and 2 before trading takes
place. Specifically, we assume that, sometime between t = 0 and t = 1, both the speculators
and the MMs receive a public and noisy signal Sp of assets 1 and 2’s payoff v. This signal is
normally distributed with mean p0 and variance σ2p > σ
2
v. We further impose that cov (Sp, v) =
cov (Sp, Svk) = σ
2
v, so that the parameter σ
2
p controls for the quality of the public signal, and
that cov (Sp, ek2) = 0.
The availability of Sp affects the level and improves the precision of the information endow-
ments of all market participants prior to trading at time t = 1, with respect to the economy of









< σ2v. The new information endowment





≤ ρ is the
correlation between any two δ∗vk and δ
∗
vj. Hence, we can interpret δ
∗
vk as the truly private (hence
less correlated) component of speculator k’s original private information endowment (δvk) in the
presence of a public signal of v. The resulting unique linear equilibrium of this amended economy






and δ∗vk, respectively, in Eqs. (3) to (6).
2.2.1 Additional Testable Implications
Pasquariello and Vega (2006) show that, in a Kyle (1985) setting similar to ours, introducing a
public signal improves market liquidity. This is the case in our economy as well. Intuitively, the
availability of a public signal of v – by making the speculators’ private information less valuable
and their trading activity less cautious – reduces the adverse selection risk for the MMs in both
the markets for asset 1 and 2, thus increasing their depth.9 In this study, we are interested in the
9It can in fact be shown that λ∗1 =
√
Mρ∗σ∗v





σn[2+(M−1)ρ∗] < λ2, consistent with
Pasquariello and Vega (2006).
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impact of the availability of Sp on both the price and liquidity differentials between on-the-run
(2) and off-the-run (1) assets.
We begin by comparing the off/on-the-run price differential in the presence of a public signal





[2 + (M − 1) ρ]
σp
p




According to Eq. (9), and ceteris paribus for the set of realized shocks driving ∆p1, the avail-
ability of a public signal lowers the price differential between asset 1 and asset 2. Intuitively, an
additional source of information about those assets’ terminal payoff (v) pushes both their prices
closer to it, the more so the better is the quality of the information (lower σ2p).
Remark 3 Ceteris paribus, the availability of a public signal decreases the off/on-the-run price
differential, the more so the lower is that signal’s volatility.





[2 + (M − 1) ρ]
σp
p
σ2p − ρσ2v [2 + (M − 1) ρ∗]
− 1
)
∆λ < 0, (10)
since it reduces the perceived adverse selection risk for the MMs in both markets, yet the most
in the market for the off-the-run asset (1) where – in absence of endowment-motivated trades
– that risk was the greatest in the equilibrium of Proposition 1. Again, this effect is stronger
when the available public signal is more precise (lower σ2p), i.e., when the speculators’ original
private information endowments are less valuable and their trading activity is less cautious.
Corollary 2 The availability of a public signal decreases the off/on-the-run liquidity differential,
the more so the lower is that signal’s volatility.
The impact of those endowments’ heterogeneity on ∆λ∗−∆λ is however less obvious, as the
following remark illustrates.
Remark 4 In the presence of many (few) speculators and a public signal, the ensuing decrease
in the off/on-the-run liquidity differential is generally increasing (decreasing) in the heterogeneity
of their private signals.
In Figure 1B, we plot ∆λ∗−∆λ, the decline in the off/on-the-run liquidity differential due to
the availability of a public signal, as a function of ρ, the correlation of speculators’ private signals
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Svk, when σp = 1.5, γ = 0.5, and M = 2, 4, 8, and 200. In the presence of numerous speculators
(high M), that decline is larger when speculators’ private signals are weakly correlated (low ρ),
since then the impact of ρ on the aggressiveness of their trading activity is greater, hence so
is the impact of the availability of a public signal on the perceived severity of adverse selection
risk in the off-the-run market (asset 1). Fewer speculators (low M) trade more cautiously with
their information endowments, and especially so in the off-the-run asset where they suffer no
endowment shocks, making that market less liquid (Figure 1A). Thus, the availability of a public
signal reduces the off/on-the-run liquidity differential the most when their incentive to trade
cautiously is the lowest (high ρ).
3 Data Description
We test the implications of the model presented in the previous section using U.S. Treasury bond
market data and U.S. macroeconomic announcements.
3.1 Bond Market Data
We are interested in studying the informational role of bond trading in explaining on/off-the-
run liquidity differentials. To that purpose, we use intraday U.S. Treasury bond yields, quotes,
transactions, and signed trades for the most recently issued – on-the-run –and the second most
recently issued – i.e., just off-the-run – three-month, six-month, one-year, two-year, five-year,
and ten-year Treasury bills and notes. We focus on these bonds because, according to Fleming
(1997), Brandt and Kavajecz (2004), and Goldreich et al. (2005), those are the securities with
the greatest liquidity and where the majority of informed trading takes place.
We obtain the data from GovPX, a firm that collects quote and trade information from six of
the seven main interdealer brokers (with the notable exception of Cantor Fitzgerald).10 Fleming
(1997) argues that these six brokers account for approximately two-thirds of the interdealer-
broker market, which in turn translates into approximately 45% of the trading volume in the
secondary market for Treasury securities. Our sample includes every transaction taking place
during “regular trading hours,” from 7:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST),
10Over our sample period (between 1992 and 2000), the major interdealer brokers in the U.S. Treasury market
are Cantor Fitzgerald Inc., Garban Ltd., Hilliard Farber & Co. Inc., Liberty Brokerage Inc., RMJ Securities
Corp., and Tullet and Tokyo Securities Inc. During that time, Cantor Fitzgerald’s share of the interdealer
Treasury market was about 30%, according to Goldreich et al. (2005). Nevertheless, Cantor Fitzgerald is a
dominant player only in the “long end” of the Treasury yield curve, which we do not analyze in this paper.
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between January 2, 1992 and December 29, 2000. GovPX stopped recording intraday volume
afterward. Strictly speaking, the U.S. Treasury market is open 24 hours a day; yet, 95% of
the trading volume occurs during those hours. Thus, to remove fluctuations in bond yields due
to illiquidity, we ignore trades outside that narrower interval. Finally, the data contains some
interdealer brokers’ posting errors not previously filtered out by GovPX. We eliminate these
errors following the procedure described in Fleming’s (2003) appendix.
We complement the GovPX data with information on those bills and notes’ fundamental
characteristics (daily modified duration and convexity) from Morgan Markets, and with official
data on the history of those bonds’ routinely scheduled Treasury auctions: the date of the auction,
the amount of competitive, noncompetitive, and System Open Market Account (SOMA) tenders
(a measure of government debt demand), the amount of tenders accepted by the U.S. Treasury
(a measure of government debt supply), and high, low, and average accepted competitive yield
bids. This information is publicly available on the U.S. Treasury website.11
We report summary statistics for the following variables in Table 1A (Treasury bills) and
Table 1B (Treasury notes): end-of-day bond yields (Yt, as in Fleming, 2003), average daily quoted
bid-ask price spreads (St),12 modified duration (Dt), modified convexity (Ct), average amount
tendered at the auction, average amount accepted at the auction, and range of competitive
yield bids at the auction (highest bid minus lowest bid divided by average accepted competitive
bid, HLt). Bond yields are in percentage, i.e., were multiplied by 100; bid-ask spreads are in
basis points, i.e., were multiplied by 10, 000; total amount tendered and accepted are in billions
of U.S. dollars; modified durations are in fractions of 365 days. Not surprisingly, given the
prevalence of an upward-sloping yield curve during the sample period, mean Treasury bond
yields are increasing with maturity and duration. Lastly, we compute average daily off/on-the-
run bid-ask spread differentials as ∆St = S
off
t − Sont and the corresponding yield differentials as
∆Yt = Y
off
t − Y ont for each of the bills and notes in our sample, consistent with both existing
literature (e.g., Krishnamurthy, 2002; Goldreich et al., 2005) and widespread market practices.
We plot the resulting time series of ∆St and ∆Yt in Figure 2 by week to smooth daily variability,
as in Fleming (2003). Notably, these graphs reveal occasional gaps in GovPX market coverage,
especially among six-month bills and ten-year notes in the earlier and latter parts of the sample
period, respectively.13
11http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/of/ofaicqry.htm.
12The analysis that follows is nonetheless robust to employing average daily effective bid-ask spreads (e.g., as
in Goldreich et al., 2005) or bid-ask yield spreads.
13For a discussion of the incompleteness of GovPX coverage of the U.S. Treasury market, see Boni and Leach
(2002) and Fleming (2003).
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There is clear, economically significant evidence of the on-the-run liquidity phenomenon in
the U.S. Treasury bond market between 1992 and 2000: Off/on-the-run spread differentials
∆St are large (e.g., on average, never less than 50% of the corresponding off-the-run spreads),
always positive (solid line, left axis in Figures 2A to 2F), and statistically significant across all
maturities (at the 1% level, in Tables 1A and 1B). Mean daily spread differentials range from less
than one basis point (two-year, Figure 2D) to more than 17 basis points (three-month, Figure
2A). Interestingly, the evidence is instead mixed for off/on-the-run yield differentials ∆Yt: Albeit
always statistically significant (again at the 1% level, in Tables 1A and 1B), average daily∆Yt are
large and steadily positive only for five-year and ten-year notes (gray line, right axis in Figures
2E and 2F), while negative (and often largely so) for all the other securities in the sample, as
also reported in Fleming (2003). Accordingly, the correlation between daily yield and spread
differentials – ρ (∆Yt,∆St) in Tables 1A and 1B – is positive and statistically significant only
for two-year and five-year notes, either insignificant or negative otherwise, and small (i.e., never
beyond ±0.25) in all cases.
This preliminary evidence suggests that i) off/on-the-run liquidity differentials are consis-
tently economically significant, while yield differentials are often much less so and ii) off/on-
the-run yield and bid-ask spread differentials often decouple, i.e., cannot be interpreted as per-
fect substitutes, as implied by the illiquidity premium hypothesis of Amihud and Mendelson
(1986, 1991) and by most of the subsequent empirical and theoretical research on the on-the-
run phenomenon. Thus, this evidence further motivates our study of the determinants of the
off/on-the-run liquidity differentials in fixed income markets.
3.2 Macroeconomic Data
The model of Section 2 relates the off/on-the-run liquidity differential to the heterogeneity of
private information about fundamentals among sophisticated market participants, as well as to
the release of public information about those fundamentals. In this paper, we use the Interna-
tional Money Market Services (MMS) Inc. real-time data on the expectations and realizations
of 25 of the most relevant U.S. macroeconomic fundamentals to estimate announcement sur-
prises and heterogeneity of speculators’ signals about them.14 Specifically, we use the MMS
standard deviation across those professional forecasts as a measure of the dispersion of beliefs
across speculators. This measure of information heterogeneity is widely adopted in the litera-
ture on investors’ reaction to information releases in the stock market (e.g., Diether et al., 2002;
14Detailed discussions of the properties of this dataset can be found in Fleming and Remolona (1997), Andersen
et al. (2003), and Pasquariello and Vega (2006).
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Kallberg and Pasquariello, 2004); Green (2004) and Pasquariello and Vega (2006) recently use
it in a bond market context. The 18 macroeconomic news for which this variable is available in
our sample, the corresponding number of announcements, and the reporting agency are listed in
Table 2.
The dispersion of beliefs is positively correlated across the macroeconomic announcements
in our sample, yet not strongly so. For instance, Pasquariello and Vega (2006) report that the
pairwise correlation between each announcement and arguably the most important of them, the
Nonfarm Payroll report (e.g., Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998; Andersen et al., 2004; Brenner et
al., 2005), is positive, albeit not statistically significant for most of the announcements in the
sample (ρ (payroll) in Table 2). Thus, we follow Pasquariello and Vega (2006) and construct
three alternative measures of dispersion of beliefs during announcement and non-announcement
days: one based exclusively on the Payroll announcement, another based on 7 “influential”
announcements (Nonfarm Payroll Employment, Retail Sales, New Home Sales, Consumer Confi-
dence Index, NAPM Index, Index of Leading Indicators, and Initial Unemployment Claims.), and
the last one based on the 18 announcements in Table 2. Pasquariello and Vega (2006) label those
macroeconomic announcements “influential” for they are the only ones having a statistically
significant impact on day-to-day bond yield changes over our sample period.
We then define a monthly proxy for the aggregate degree of information heterogeneity about




SDjt − bµ(SDjt)bσ(SDjt) , (11)
where SDjt is the standard deviation of announcement j across professional forecasts, bµ(SDjt)
and bσ(SDjt) are its sample mean and standard deviation, respectively, and P is equal to either
1 (Nonfarm Payroll Employment), 7 (the “influential” announcements listed above), or 18 (i.e.,
those in Table 2). The standardization in Eq. (11) is necessary because units of measurement
differ across economic variables. We use the monthly dispersion estimates from these three
methodologies to classify days in which the corresponding monthly variable SSDPt is above
(below) the top (bottom) 70th (30th) percentile of its empirical distribution as days with high
(low) information heterogeneity. The resulting time series of high (+1) and low (−1) dispersion
days are positively correlated: Their correlations range from 0.37 (between the Payroll-based
series, P = 1, and the series constructed with the influential announcements, P = 7) to 0.70
(between the series using all announcements, P = 18, and the one based only on the influential
news releases, P = 7).
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4 Empirical Analysis
The model of Section 2 generates several implications for both off/on-the-run liquidity and yield
differentials in bond markets that we now test in this section. The database described in Section
3 allows us to compute directly the daily off/on-the run yield differentials, ∆Yt = Y
off
t − Y ont ,
for each of the bills and notes in our sample. Computing off/on-the-run liquidity differentials is
a more challenging task. In the context of our model, and consistent with Kyle (1985), market
liquidity for a traded asset i is defined as the marginal impact of an unexpected trade on the
equilibrium price of that asset, λi. This measure of liquidity is typically estimated as the slope λt
of the regression of yield or price changes on the observed aggregate order flow (net volume) over
either intraday or daily time intervals. Hence, when transaction data is available, this procedure
allows for a direct assessment of our model’s implications for off/on-the-run liquidity differentials
∆λ. The GovPX dataset contains such data, i.e., allows for the direct estimation of λofft and
λont .
Unfortunately, this procedure also suffers from several shortcomings. In particular, it requires
the econometrician i) to specify a model for the prior estimation of the unobserved portion of the
aggregate order flow, as well as ii) to control for many additional microstructure imperfections
which, together with informed and liquidity trading, may affect its dynamics (e.g., Hasbrouck,
2004).15 Hence, any inference from such an effort is subject to potential misspecification, as
well as to the potential biases stemming from measurement errors in the dependent variable.
The latter are likely to be severe if any independent variable explaining λt is also not measured
properly (e.g., see the discussion in Greene, 1997, p. 436). In addition, the relative scarcity of
trades in off-the-run bonds often makes the estimation of λofft problematic (e.g., Pasquariello
and Vega, 2006).
In light of these considerations, in this paper we measure each market’s liquidity using its daily
average quoted bid-ask spread, St, for several reasons. First, off-the-run and on-the-run spreads
(Sont and S
off
t ) and spread differentials (∆St = S
off
t − Sont ) are virtually privy of measurement
error. Further, there is an extensive literature relating their magnitude and dynamics to the
informational role of trading (see O’Hara, 1995, for a review). Lastly, when comparing several
alternative measures of liquidity in the U.S. Treasury market, Fleming (2003) finds that the
simple bid-ask spread is the most highly correlated with both direct estimates of price impact
and well-known episodes of poor liquidity in those markets.16 The inference that follows is
15Green (2004), Brandt and Kavajecz (2004), and Pasquariello and Vega (2006) are recent examples of such
efforts in the U.S. Treasury market.
16In this paper we do not pursue any of the techniques available in the literature to separate the portion of
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nonetheless robust to replacing ∆St with ∆λt = λ
off
t −λont estimated using various intraday time
intervals.
4.1 The Benchmark On-The-Run Phenomenon
The main objective of this paper is to identify and measure the informational role of trading for
off/on-the-run liquidity differentials in fixed income markets. We start by assessing the economic
and statistical significance of the on-the-run liquidity and yield phenomenon in the three-month,
six-month, one-year, two-year, five-year, and ten-year Treasury bills and notes between 1992
and 2000. This is a necessary step in our analysis, for recent studies (e.g., Krishnamurthy,
2002; Strebulaev, 2002) argue that off/on-the-run yield differentials may either disappear or
considerably diminish once controlling for these bonds’ fundamental characteristics.
Some of those fundamental characteristics are in fact likely to differ for on-the-run bonds and
their closest off-the-run securities, although these securities’ liquidation values are assumed to be
identical in our model. In particular, Table 1 suggests that duration and convexity differentials
between them may be large. For instance, both off/on-the-run modified duration and convexity
differentials (∆Dt = D
off
t −Dont and ∆Ct = Cofft − Cont , respectively) are always negative and
significant at the 1% level. Hence, on-the-run bonds are on average less sensitive to parallel shifts
of the yield curve and to large, sudden yield jumps than corresponding off-the-run securities at
each maturity. Investors’ expectations and risk aversion may then affect their relative preferences
toward these assets, i.e., may ultimately affect these assets’ relative prices and liquidity in a
systematic fashion.
To assess the empirical relevance of these considerations, we specify the following two bench-
mark models of off/on-the-run spread and yield differentials:
∆St = βs0 + βs1∆Dt + βs2∆Ct + εt (12)
∆Yt = βy0 + βy1∆Dt + βy2∆Ct + εt (13)
for each of the bills and notes in our sample. We estimate these regressions by OLS and evaluate
the statistical significance of the coefficients’ estimates, reported in Table 3, with Newey-West
standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The results in Panel A
the bid-ask spread due to adverse selection from those due to order processing costs or inventory control (e.g.,
Stoll, 1989; George et al., 1991). Execution costs are in fact likely to be similar across Treasury bonds , hence to
cancel out when computing average daily off/on-the-run spread differentials ∆St. Further, we find (and discuss in
Section 4.1) that those differentials are insensitive to the corresponding repo rate differentials, which may proxy
for the relative cost of unwinding undesired inventory positions in the off-the-run and on-the-run markets.
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of Table 3 provide strong evidence of the on-the-run liquidity phenomenon in the U.S. Treasury
market. For all maturities, both the magnitude and significance of estimates for the average
off/on-the-run liquidity differentials (βs0 in Eq. (12)) are virtually unaffected– or even amplified
– by the inclusion of duration and convexity differentials. However, those differentials explain a
large portion of off/on-the-run yield differentials: After controlling for ∆Dt and ∆Ct, estimates
for the average yield differentials ∆Yt (βy0 in Eq. (13)), in Panel B of Table 3, either are positive
but decline by more than 50% (for ten-year notes), become statistically insignificant (for one-year
bills and two-year notes), or turn out to be negative (for three-month and six-month bills and
five-year notes), contrary to the illiquidity premium hypothesis of Amihud and Mendelson (1986,
1991).17 Ceteris paribus, in most cases it is greater duration (βy1 < 0) and lower convexity
(βy2 > 0) that make on-the-run bonds more expensive than their off-the-run counterparts.
18
Existing research also suggests that off/on-the-run yield differentials may be driven by the
relative degree of specialness of the corresponding on-the-run and off-the-run Treasury securities
(e.g., Krishnamurthy, 2002).19 Comprehensive data on repo rates for all the securities in our
sample and over its entire length is unavailable to us. We attempt to account for the role of repo
specialness for the on-the-run phenomenon by using the (limited) information on these rates
provided by Morgan Markets only from 1997 onward. We do so by amending Eqs. (12) and
(13) to include off/on-the-run repo rate differentials as well. The estimation of these amended
regressions, not reported here, suggests that our inference above is robust to the inclusion of
those repo differentials and that their impact on both ∆St and ∆Yt is in all cases statistically
insignificant.
Overall, these results indicate that off/on-the-run bid-ask spread differentials are positive, eco-
nomically significant – averaging more than half of the corresponding mean off-the-run spread
– and cannot be explained by differences in the fundamental characteristics of the underlying
securities. Off/on-the-run yield differentials are instead neither uniformly positive nor uniformly
significant. Together with Table 1, this preliminary evidence is inconsistent with a common
premise to much of the existing empirical and theoretical literature on this issue, for it sug-
17Consistently, Goldreich et al. (2005) find that, after adjusting for coupon and maturity differentials with prices
of hypothetical Treasury notes, the resulting average daily two-year off/on-the-run yield differential between 1994
and 2000 is small (i.e., never larger than 1.5 basis points at its peak) and rapidly declining to zero during the
monthly auction cycle until a newer note is issued (Figure 2, p 13). Goldreich et al. (2005) do not report
information on the statistical significance of that yield differential over their sample period.






t , and C
on
t
in Eqs. (12) and (13).
19For a detailed description of the functioning of the repo market for U.S. Treasury securities, see also Fleming
and Garbade (2006).
18
gests a systematic decoupling of the on-the-run liquidity phenomenon from the on-the-run yield
phenomenon.
4.2 Endowment Shocks and the On-The-Run Phenomenon
The analysis so far reveals that i) off/on-the-run liquidity differentials in the U.S. Treasury market
are both economically and statistically significant, ii) off/on-the-run yield differentials are not
so, and iii) the two phenomena are neither uniquely related to each other nor explained away by
differences in fundamentals. The latter two facts provide indirect support for our model since,
in that stylized market setting, equilibrium off/on-the run price differentials between securities
with identical terminal payoffs can be either positive or negative (Remark 1). We are now ready
to test directly the model’s main implication for the former fact, namely that off/on-the-run
liquidity differentials are driven by uncertainty about speculators’ endowments in the on-the-run
securities (Corollary 1).
According to our theory, government auctions are the critical events discriminating among
those otherwise identical assets, for they lead sophisticated speculators to acquire undisclosed
amounts of just-issued – hence by definition on-the-run – securities (ek2). When sensitive to
both their short- and long-term wealth, these speculators’ subsequent trades in the on-the-run
security are informationally suboptimal. This attenuates market makers’ adverse selection in that
market, the more so the more short-term wealth matters to speculators (γ) and the greater is
the uncertainty surrounding their endowments (σ2e), ultimately improving the market’s liquidity
with respect to the one for the off-the-run asset.
These results, summarized in Corollary 1, translate naturally into two testable conjectures
in fixed income markets. The first one stems from the observation that the time when assets
1 and 2’s identical payoffs v are realized in our model (t = 2) can be thought of as the time
when two identical bonds mature. Ceteris paribus, it is then reasonable to conjecture that the
distinction between short- and long-term should be more relevant for Treasury notes than for
bills, i.e., γ ≈ 1− γ and greater off/on-the-run liquidity wedge ∆St for the latter but γ < 1− γ
and smaller ∆St for the former. Accordingly, Panel B of Table 3 shows that the average off/on-
the-run liquidity differential after controlling for those bonds’ fundamental characteristics – βs0
of Eq. (12) – is greater (both economically and statistically) for Treasury bills (averaging 0.17
basis points) than for Treasury notes (less than 0.02 basis points on average).
The second conjecture stems from the observation that uncertainty about speculators’ endow-
ments (σ2e) is likely to be the greatest – hence the on-the-run liquidity phenomenon the most
intense – at the completion of an auction and declining afterward, i.e., when market participants
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can learn from observed price movements about those endowments. We test for this possibility
by estimating, for every bill and note in our sample, the following amended specifications of Eqs.
(12) and (13):
∆St = βs0 +
XN
i=1
βs0iAuctiont−i + βs1∆Dt + βs2∆Ct + εt (14)
∆Yt = βy0 +
XN
i=1
βy0iAuctiont−i + βy1∆Dt + βy2∆Ct + εt (15)
where Auctiont−i is a dummy variable equal to one on day t if day t−i is the most recent auction
date for the corresponding bond and equal to zero otherwise. We choose N = 4 for three-month
and six-month bills and N = 10 for all other bonds to prevent each post-auction window to
overlap with the window of subsequent regular and ad hoc auction reopenings.20 Yet, similar
inference ensues from either bigger or smaller N . We cannot estimate the contemporaneous
impact of the auction on ∆St and ∆Yt (i = 0) since GovPX reports transaction data on the
auctioned on-the-run and the just off-the-run bonds only from the first business day after the
auction date (t − 1) onward. Hence, we interpret estimates of βs0 and βy0 – the mean spread
and yield differentials over the unaccounted portion of the prior auction cycle ending on day t
– as a proxy for the extent of the on-the-run phenomenon immediately before trading on the
new bond begins. We report estimates of Eqs. (14) and (15) in Tables 4A and 4B, respectively.
Table 4A indicates that, consistent with our conjecture, the off/on-the-run bid-ask spread
differential ∆St is lower immediately following on-the-run auction dates: Estimated coefficients
βs0i in Eq. (14) are negative and significant for both bills and notes, albeit often first increas-
ing and then decreasing in absolute magnitude. Hence, average liquidity differentials βs0 + βsi
generally decline in the immediate aftermath of Treasury auctions, albeit often either flat or
slowly increasing toward βs0 thereafter.
21 According to the illiquidity premium hypothesis of
Amihud and Mendelson (1986, 1991), this should translate into lower off/on-the-run yield differ-
entials (yet increasingly less so at greater lags i). Table 4B suggests otherwise: Conditional on
βy0 > 0 (βy0 < 0), the coefficients βy0i in Eq. (15) are negative and significant only for five-year
(one-year) notes, while instead either insignificant or positive and significant for the other bills
and notes in the sample.22 Equivalently, Tables 4A and 4B suggest that, immediately following
20See Fabozzi and Fleming (2004) for a detailed description of the functioning of U.S. Treasury auctions.
21Consistently, Goldreich et al. (2005) show that average daily quoted and effective bid-ask spreads over the
first 100 trading days of newly-issued two-year Treasury notes (Figure 1A) are first declining, then flat, and
eventually steadily widening afterward.
22Krishnamurthy (2002) finds that off/on-the-run yield differentials for 30-year Treasury bonds generally narrow
following auction dates. We do not include the long bond in our sample for the GovPX database coverage of
that market is poor. Nonetheless, when estimating Eq. (15) for the 30-year bond using available GovPX data,
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Treasury auctions, off/on-the-run liquidity differentials decline, consistent with Corollary 1, yet
the off/on-the-run yield differentials either remain negative or turn positive and widen in the
secondary markets for government bonds, inconsistent with liquidity-based explanations.
The range of competitive yield bids at an auction HLt –defined in Section 3.1 as the ratio of
the difference between the highest and lowest bid at the auction and the average accepted com-
petitive bid – represents an additional proxy for endowment uncertainty induced by a Treasury
auction. This information is announced by the Treasury at around 1 p.m. on the auction date.
It can be argued that, ceteris paribus, the greater is that ratio the greater is the uncertainty
among uninformed market participants about the final outcome of the auction for each of the
sophisticated speculators, the greater is the uncertainty about their endowments of on-the-run
bonds (σ2e), hence the greater is the resulting off/on-the-run liquidity differential. We test for
this possibility by amending Eq. (14) as follows:
∆St = βs0 +
XN
i=1
βs0iAuctiont−i + βs1∆Dt + βs2∆Ct + βs3Xt + εt (16)
where Xt = HLt. We report estimates of βs3 in Table 5 for each of the securities in our sample.
Estimates of all other coefficients are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those in
Table 4A, hence are not reported here. Table 5 shows that the competitive yield range HLt is
strongly positively related to the liquidity differential of Treasury bills, even after controlling for
supply effects and fundamental volatility (see the discussion next), yet is mostly unrelated to that
of Treasury notes. This evidence is consistent with Corollary 1, for it suggests that the effect
of uncertainty about speculators’ endowments of the on-the-run asset (ek2) on ∆St is greater
(and in the direction of the theory) for the markets in which those speculators are more likely
to be indifferent between the short- and long-term value of their wealth (γ ≈ 1− γ), i.e., for the
Treasury securities of shorter maturity, as previously argued.23
The relative supply of new and old Treasury securities in the secondary market, as well as
the demand for the new ones in the primary market, do not play any role in the stylized model
of trading à la Kyle (1985) of Section 2. Nonetheless, these effects may intuitively contribute to
the dynamics of the bid-ask spread differentials reported in Table 4A. For instance, according
to Vayanos and Weill (2005), the ensuing search costs – such as the additional time it may
take a trader to locate a scarce off-the-run issue over its abundant on-the-run bond – may
translate into liquidity wedges and no-arbitrage price premia. We assess the relevance of these
the ensuing coefficients βy0i (not reported here) are negative (consistent with Krishnamurthy, 2002) but not
statistically significant.
23The same inference can be drawn when accounting for the interaction of HLt with the auction dummies
Auctiont−i in Eq. (16).
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considerations by amending the above regression to include either the amount tendered at the
Treasury auctions (Xt = Tent), the amount eventually accepted by the investors (Xt = Acct),
or both.24 The resulting estimated parameters, not reported here, indicate that our inference is
robust to the inclusion of supply and demand effects: Sign, magnitude, and significance of the
coefficients βs0i and βy0i are very similar to those displayed in Tables 4A and 4B. Consistent
with the intuition above, estimates of βs3 (in Table 5) are in most cases negative and significant:
Tendered and accepted amounts lower bid-ask spread differentials in the Treasury market. Yet,
their inclusion improves only marginally the overall fit – i.e., the adjusted R2, R2a – of the
regressions in Table 4A.25
4.3 The Informational Role of Trading and the On-The-Run Phe-
nomenon
The evidence reported in Section 4.2 provides further, more direct support for the basic premise
of our model, i.e., that uncertainty surrounding speculators’ endowments of new, just-auctioned
securities creates a liquidity wedge between those securities and otherwise identical, old securities.
Given this crucial premise, we now test two additional implications of our theory that stem from
the informational role of trading in our stylized model.
The first one – again from Corollary 1 – states that ceteris paribus greater uncertainty
surrounding both on-the-run and off-the-run assets’ terminal payoffs (higher σ2v) leads to greater
liquidity differentials between them, for adverse selection risk becomes more severe for uninformed
market makers in both assets, yet the more so in the off-the-run security (asset 1) where noise
trading is less intense (σ2z < σ
2
n). To evaluate this argument, we amend Eq. (16) by imposing
that Xt = V olt, the daily Eurodollar implied volatility from Bloomberg, a commonly used proxy
for the market’s perceived uncertainty surrounding U.S. monetary policy. We report estimates of
the corresponding coefficients βs3 in Table 5. Consistent with Corollary 1 and the discussion in
the previous section, greater Eurodollar implied volatility translates into greater off/on-the-run
liquidity differentials: Estimated βs3 are always positive, always statistically significant at the
5% level or better (with the exception of three-month bills), and larger for bills than notes, i.e.,
when σ2n is greater than σ
2
z (see Section 2.1.3). These coefficients are even larger after controlling
24Similar inference, not reported here, ensues from the inclusion of the interaction of both variables with auction
dummies Auctiont−i, in Eq. (16).
25According to Vayanos and Weill (2005), the ensuing search costs, such as the additional time it may take
a trader to locate a scarce off-the-run issue over its abundant on-the-run bond, may translate into no-arbitrage
price premia.
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for supply effects and endowment uncertainty, in the bottom panel of Table 5.
The second implication – from Remark 2 – states that because of the informational role of
trading in the markets for asset 1 and asset 2, the degree of heterogeneity of speculators’ private
information has an impact on the equilibrium liquidity differential between those markets whose
sign depends on speculators’ relative numerosity (M in Eq. (8)). We test for this argument by
amending Eq. (14) as follows:
∆St = βsh ×Dht + βsl ×Dlt + βsm × (1−Dht −Dlt) + βs1(Dofft −Dont ) +
βs2(C
off
t − Cont ) +
XN
i=1





βsmiAuctiont−i × (1−Dht −Dlt) + εt
where Dht (Dlt) is a dummy variable equal to one on days with high (low) information hetero-
geneity, defined in Section 3.2 as days in which the monthly variable SSDPt of Eq. (11) is above
(below) the top (bottom) 70th (30th) percentile of its empirical distribution, and equal to zero
otherwise. We compute SSDPt using all the announcements listed in Table 2 (i.e., P = 18 in
Eq. (11)). We obtain qualitatively similar results for P = 1 (Nonfarm Payroll) or P = 7 (the
influential announcements listed in Section 3.2).
For conciseness’ sake, we only show plots of the resulting estimated average liquidity differ-
entials βsh + βshi, βsm + βsmi, and βsl + βsli for i = 1, 2, 3, and 4 and for each of the bills and
notes in our sample in Figure 3. As already suggested by Table 4A, off/on-the-run bid-ask spread
wedges are positive and generally declining in the lags from the Treasury auction dates regardless
of the degree of information heterogeneity among speculators, again consistent with Corollary
1. Figure 3 also suggests that those liquidity differentials are generally sensitive to the degree
of information heterogeneity about macroeconomic fundamentals among sophisticated market
participants, consistent with Remark 2. In particular, average ∆St is generally increasing (i.e.,
βshi > βsli) in the heterogeneity of speculators’ beliefs (i.e., decreasing in ρ in Figure 1A), often
statistically significantly so, for issues of longer maturity (one-year bills to ten-year notes). This
is intuitive since, according to our model, more heterogeneously informed speculators trade more
cautiously to protect their perceived private information monopoly, the more so in the less liquid
market (off-the-run), thus widening its liquidity gap with the on-the-run market. Yet, average
spread differentials are either insensitive to or even weakly increasing in ρ (i.e., βshi / βsli) for
short-term bills. According to our model (see Figure 1A), this dichotomy may be explained by
Treasury bills’ markets being populated by fewer, hence less competitive sophisticated specu-
lators. Anecdotal evidence, the significantly wider bid-ask spreads and lower aggregate daily
trading volume and trading frequency in bills than in notes (e.g., our Tables 1A and 1B, and
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Tables 1 and 2 in Fleming, 2003), as well as the observation that informed investors may be more
active in more liquid trading venues (e.g., Chowdhry and Nanda, 1991) suggest that this may
indeed be the case.
Overall, the above results provide additional support for our model, for they indicate that
the magnitude and dynamics of off/on-the-run liquidity differentials – which we have showed
to be related to endowment uncertainty following on-the-run auctions in Section 4.2 – are also
crucially related to the informational role of trading in the U.S. Treasury market.
4.4 Announcement Days and the On-The-Run Phenomenon
Macroeconomic news are frequently released to the public in the U.S. financial markets. For
instance, more than 2, 000 of the news items listed in Table 2 were announced, often on the
same day, over our sample period. These news releases are especially relevant for the U.S.
Treasury market since their potential information content is deemed to play a crucial role for the
valuation of the bonds there traded. Consistently, Pasquariello and Vega (2006) find that the
release of macroeconomic information (weakly) improve liquidity in the Treasury note market.
According to our model, these news releases may be relevant for the on-the-run phenomenon
as well. In particular, we showed in Section 2.2 that the availability of a public signal of the
identical terminal payoff of both the off-the-run and the on-the-run securities (v) reduces both
their price and liquidity differentials – the more so the better is the quality of that signal– for
it pushes both prices closer to v and attenuates both markets’ adverse selection risk, yet mainly
where most severe (the off-the-run market).
We assess the empirical relevance of these considerations by using the database of macroe-
conomic announcements described in Section 3.2. Specifically, the above implications translate
into observing a negative difference between each βanns0w and β
noann
s0w and between each β
ann
y0w and














βnoanny0w dtw + βy1∆Dt + βy2∆Ct + εt (19)
where Annt is a dummy variable equal to one if either the Nonfarm Payroll Employment report
(P = 1), any of the 7 influential announcements listed in Section 3.2 (P = 7), or any of the
18 announcements listed in Table 2 (P = 18) is released on day t and equal to zero otherwise,
while dtw are day-of-week dummy variables, from w = 1 (Monday) to 5 (Friday), to control for
event-day clustering. We report the resulting estimates of day-specific differences in Table 6 for
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each of the bonds in our sample when P = 7.26 We discuss the estimates for P = 1 or 18 below.
Consistent with our model (Remark 3), the difference of differences βanny0w − βnoanny0w is more
often negative when statistically significant. Hence, off/on-the-run yield differentials ∆Yt are
generally lower during important announcement days. The evidence in Table 6 is however less
supportive of Corollary 2: Estimates of βanns0w − βnoanns0w are not only negative much less frequently
than positive but also most often statistically indistinguishable from zero. Not surprisingly,
public news releases are accompanied by lower off/on-the-run liquidity and yield differentials
(albeit rarely in a statistically significant fashion) primarily in the market for Treasury bills,
where we conjectured that the distinction between short- and long-term would be less relevant
(γ ≈ 1− γ), hence the liquidity wedge induced by auction-driven endowment shock uncertainty
of greater magnitude (see Section 4.2).
In short, the evidence presented in Table 6 is mixed. This can be due to several factors.
Extant theories suggest alternative mechanisms mitigating the impact of the availability of public
signals on ∆St. For instance, according to Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) sophisticated investors
may divert much of their trading activity to the most liquid venue to maximize their expected
profits. In such a setting, the release of high-quality public information, by devaluing those
investors’ private signals, may make that migration even more intense, thus widening – rather
than tightening, as instead argued in Section 2.2.1 – the equilibrium liquidity differentials among
markets. In addition, both the dispersion of beliefs among market participants and the quality of
available public signals might vary across announcements. According to our model (Remarks 3
and 4 and Corollary 2), both factors may affect sign and significance of the relation between the
availability of public signals and the on-the-run phenomenon. The weaker statistical significance
of estimates for βanns0w − βnoanns0w and βanny0w − βnoanny0w for the narrowest and broadest – hence of
possibly the highest and lowest quality – sets of macroeconomic news (i.e., for P = 1 and 18,
not reported here) provides preliminary support to both sets of arguments above, respectively.
To test for the relevance of these considerations, we proceed in two directions. First, we
focus on the impact of public signal noise (σ2p of Section 2.2) on ∆p
∗
1 −∆p1 and ∆λ∗ −∆λ. We
measure σ2p using the U.S. government’s frequent revisions of previously released macroeconomic
information, as in Aruoba (2004) and Pasquariello and Vega (2006). Specifically, we augment
our database with the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia “Real Time Data Set” (RTDS) of
all “informative” monthly data revisions (i.e., those due to newly available information).27 These
26As a word of caution, we observe that one of the 7 influential news in the MMS database, the Initial Unem-
ployment Claims report, is released weekly in all but 24 Thursdays in our sample. Hence, when P = 7 or 18,
both βnoanns04 and β
noann
y04 are estimated with only 24 observations.
27Occasionally, the U.S. government performs “uninformative” revisions of its previously announced data, i.e.,
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revisions are available to us only for Capacity Utilization, Industrial Production, and Nonfarm
Payroll Employment, among the 18 news releases listed in Table 2. We then compute those
public signals’ noise as the absolute difference between each initial announcement and its last
revision and label the corresponding announcement days as characterized by high (low) noise σ2p
when that difference is in the top (bottom) 70th (30th) percentile of its empirical distribution.28
Lastly, we estimate Eqs. (18) and (19) for each of the RTDS announcements in either of their
corresponding subsets of high and low σ2p days in our sample. We report the ensuing differences
βanns0w − βnoanns0w and βanny0w − βnoanny0w for Industrial Production in Table 7.
The resulting estimates are striking: Both average∆St and ∆Yt during Industrial Production
announcement days (Panels B and D) are lower than during nonannouncement days (Panels A
and C) more often, more so, and more significantly so when the quality of that announcement is
higher. For instance, βanns0w − βnoanns0w are often negative and/or significant in Panel B but mostly
either positive and/or insignificant in Panel A, especially for Treasury bills – i.e., where we
expect the underlying adverse selection differential between on-the-run and off-the-run securities
to be most severe (γ ≈ 1 − γ). The inference drawn upon Capacity Utilization announcement
days (not reported here) is qualitatively and quantitatively similar. However, we did not find
any meaningful differences in βanns0w −βnoanns0w and βanny0w−βnoanny0w when estimated in correspondence
with Nonfarm Payroll announcement days (also not reported here). This is not surprising, in
light of the potentially offsetting liquidity-migration effect discussed in Chowdhry and Nanda
(1991), since those news releases are commonly characterized as of the highest and most homo-
geneous quality.29 Thus, Table 7 suggests that the decline in off/on-the-run bid-ask spread and
yield differentials in the presence of a public signal is both more economically and statistically
significant when σ2p is low than when σ
2
p is high, consistent with our theory.
Second, Remark 4 states (and Figure 1B shows) that in the presence of a public signal of the
due to definitional changes (such as changes in the base-year or changes in seasonal weights). Over our sample
period, Industrial Production was the only announcement undergoing one such “uninformative” change, a base-
year revision in February 1998. For a more detailed description of the RTDS dataset and its properties, see
Croushore and Stark (2001).
28By definition, the final published revision of an announcement represents the most accurate measure for the
corresponding macroeconomic variable. The above procedure is motivated by the observation that these revisions
can be interpreted as noise since they are predictable based on past information (e.g., Mork, 1987; Faust, Rogers,
and Wright, 2003; Aruoba, 2004). Pasquariello and Vega (2006) find a more pronounced improvement in Treasury
notes’ market liquidity when low noise announcements are released to the public.
29E.g., Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), among others, label the Nonfarm Payroll report the “king” of announce-
ments for its release has the most significant impact on most asset markets. For more on the special role played
by Nonfarm Payroll announcements in financial markets, see Piazzesi et al. (2006).
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traded assets’ fundamentals (Sp), the decline in the resulting off/on-the-run liquidity differential
is the greatest when information heterogeneity is the highest (ρ is lowest) among sophisticated
investors in the venues when the latter are most numerous, i.e., in the Treasury notes’ markets
(as argued in Section 4.3). Intuitively, adverse selection is most severe in the off-the-run market
(asset 1) when many speculators are most cautious (low ρ), hence the benefit of Sp’s availability
for the market-makers is the greatest. We assess this argument by estimating Eq. (18) over the
subset of days in our sample characterized by high (low) information heterogeneity, defined in
Section 3.2 as days in which the average dispersion of professional forecasts of P announcements
from the MMS database – SSDPt of Eq. (11) – is above (below) the top (bottom) 70th (30th)
percentile of its empirical distribution. We then report the ensuing differences βanns0w − βnoanns0w in
Table 8 when P = 7 and ρ is either low (Panel A) or high (Panel B). Consistent with Remark
4 and Figure 1B, the estimated βanns0w − βnoanns0w are larger and more often negative – i.e., off/on-
the-run bid-ask spread differentials ∆St decline during announcement days – when speculators’
beliefs are more heterogeneous (SSDPt is high, in Panel A), especially for longer-term bills and
notes. Yet, since we are not cross-sorting announcement days by public signal noise (as in Table
7), most of these differences are again not statistically significant (as in Table 6). Qualitatively
similar inference (not reported here) stems from P = 1 or 18.
Overall, the above evidence indicates that, as postulated by our theory, the availability of
public signals of assets’ terminal payoffs mitigates the on-the-run phenomenon in the Treasury
market – which we model as and show to be related to auction-driven endowment uncertainty in
Sections 2.1 and 4.2, respectively – by alleviating adverse selection among market participants.
5 Conclusions and Future Research
The existence of a negative liquidity differential between on-the-run and off-the-run securities is
a pervasive and not fully understood feature of both domestic and international fixed income
markets. The main goal of this paper is to deepen our understanding of the links between
this important aspect of the on-the-run phenomenon, news about fundamentals, and order flow
conditional on the investors’ dispersion of beliefs and the public signals’ noise.
To that end, we develop a parsimonious model of speculative trading in multiple assets
in the presence of heterogeneously informed, imperfectly competitive traders, auction-driven
endowment shocks identifying the on-the-run security from the off-the-run security, and a public
signal of their identical terminal value. We then test its equilibrium implications by studying
the determinants of daily differences in yields and in bid-ask spreads – a common and effective
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measure of bond market liquidity – for on-the-run and off-the-run three-month, six-month, and
one-year U.S. Treasury bills and two-year, five-year, and ten-year U.S. Treasury notes.
Our evidence indicates that i) the resulting off/on-the-run liquidity differentials are large,
even after controlling for several differences in their intrinsic characteristics (such as duration,
convexity, or repo rates), ii) their corresponding yield differentials are instead neither economi-
cally nor statistically significant, inconsistent with the illiquidity premium hypothesis, and iii) an
economically meaningful portion of those liquidity differentials is linked to strategic trading activ-
ity in both security types. The nature of this linkage is sensitive to the uncertainty surrounding
auction shocks and the economy, the intensity of investors’ dispersion of beliefs, and the noise of
the public announcement. In particular, and consistent with our model, off/on-the-run liquidity
differentials are larger for bonds of shorter maturity, immediately following bond auction dates,
when the dispersion of auction bids is higher, when fundamental uncertainty is greater, when
the beliefs of sophisticated traders are more heterogeneous, in the absence of macroeconomic
announcements or when the latter are noisier.
These findings suggest that any analysis of the on-the-run phenomenon, whether theoretical
or empirical, cannot prescind from the endogenous determination of market liquidity in both
the on-the-run and the off-the-run bonds. We believe this is an important implication for future
research on this topic.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. As noted in Section 2.1.2, the proof is by construction. We start
by guessing that equilibrium p1i and xki are given by p1i = A0i+A1iω1i and xki = B0i+B1iδvk+
C1iek2, respectively, where A1i > 0 and i = {1, 2}. Those expressions and the definition of ω1i
imply that, for the kth speculator,
E (p1i|δvk, ek2) = A0i +A1ixki +A1iB0i (M − 1) +A1iB1i (M − 1) ρδvk. (A-1)
Using Eq. (A-1), the first order conditions of the maximization of the kth speculator’s expected
utility Ek1 (Uk) with respect to xk1 and xk2 are given by
p0 + δvk −A01 − (M + 1)A11B01 − 2A11B11δvk − (M − 1)A11B11ρδvk − 2A11C11ek2 = 0 (A-2)
p0 +
γ
1− γA12ek2 + δvk −A02 − (M + 1)A12B02 (A-3)
−2A12B12δvk − (M − 1)A12B12ρδvk − 2A12C12ek2 = 0,
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respectively. The second order conditions are satisfied, since 2A1i > 0. For Eqs. (A-2) and (A-3)
to be true, it must be that
p0 −A01 = (M + 1)A11B01 (A-4)
2A11B11 = 1− (M − 1)A11B11ρ (A-5)
2A11C11 = 0 (A-6)
p0 −A02 = (M + 1)A12B02 (A-7)




Eqs. (A-6) and (A-9) imply that C11 = 0 and C12 = 12
γ
1−γ . The distributional assumptions
of Section 2.1 imply that the order flows ω11 and ω12 are normally distributed with means
E (ω11) =MB01 and E (ω12) =MB02, and variances var (ω11) =MB211ρσ
2
v [1 + (M − 1) ρ] + σ2z
and var (ω12) = MB212ρσ
2
v [1 + (M − 1) ρ] + σ2n, respectively. Since cov (v,ω1i) = MB1iρσ2v, it
ensues that





v [1 + (M − 1) ρ] + σ2z
(ω11 −MB01) (A-10)





v [1 + (M − 1) ρ] + σ2n
(ω12 −MB02) . (A-11)
According to the definition of a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in this economy (Section 2.1.1),
p1i = E (v|ω1i). Therefore, our conjectures for p11 and p12 imply that







v [1 + (M − 1) ρ] + σ2z
(A-13)







v [1 + (M − 1) ρ] + σ2n
. (A-15)
The expressions for A0i, A1i, B0i, and B1i in Proposition 1 must solve the system made of Eqs.
(A-4), (A-5), (A-7), (A-8), and (A12) to (A15) to represent a linear equilibrium. Defining A11B01
from Eq. (A-4) and A12B02 from Eq. (A-7), and plugging them into Eqs. (A-12) and (A-14),
respectively, leads us to A01 = A02 = p0. Thus, it must be that B01 = B02 = 0 to satisfy Eqs.
(A-4) and (A-7). We are left with the task of finding A1i and B1i. Solving Eqs. (A-5) and (A-8)
for A11 and A12, respectively, we get
A11 =
1
B11 [2 + (M − 1) ρ] (A-16)
A12 =
1
B12 [2 + (M − 1) ρ] . (A-17)
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, i.e. that B11 = σz√Mρσv and B12 =
σn√
Mρσv
. Substituting these expressions
back into Eqs. (A-16) and (A-17) implies that A11 =
√
Mρσv




Finally, we observe that Proposition 1 is equivalent to a symmetric Cournot equilibrium with
M speculators. Therefore, the “backward reaction mapping” introduced by Novshek (1984) to
find n-firm Cournot equilibria proves that, given any linear pricing rule, the symmetric linear
strategies xki of Eqs. (5) and (6) indeed represent the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the
Bayesian game among speculators.
Proof of Remark 1. The statement is immediate from the observation of Eq. (7).
Proof of Corollary 1. The on/off-the run liquidity spread ∆λ of Eq. (8) is posi-
tive since σ2z < σ
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0 when ρ ≤ 2
M−1 and is negative otherwise. In particular,
∂∆λ
∂ρ
is always positive when M = 2 or




Proof of Remark 3. The statement follows from the observation that, ceteris paribus for
information, endowment, and liquidity shocks (i.e., such that both ∆p∗1 and ∆p1 have the same
sign), the sign of ∆p∗1 − ∆p1 of Eq. (9) is equal to the sign of −∆p1 – hence |∆p∗1| < |∆p1|
– since σ2p > σ
2
v, ρ











































> 0, and ∂∆p1
∂σp
= 0, i.e., that, again ceteris paribus for the shocks driving
∆p1, |∆p∗1 −∆p1| is greater the smaller is σp.
Proof of Corollary 2. The first part of the statement stems from the fact that ∆λ∗−∆λ











∆λ, ∆λ > 0 (see the proof of Corollary
1), σ2p > σ
2
v, ρ


























> 0, and ∂∆λ
∂σp
= 0. Lastly, limσp→∞ ρ




Proof of Remark 4. The statement stems from the fact that ∂∆λ
∗−∆λ
∂ρ
can be shown to
be a complex rational function of ρ whose highest nonnegative-integer power in the numerator
(denominator) is 4 (2) and whose critical values are complex functions of M . In particular,
algebraic analysis of ∂∆λ
∗−∆λ
∂ρ
shows that there exists only one stationary value ρ ∈ (0, 1] for
∆λ∗ −∆λ when M is either large or small (M = 2 or 3, as in the proof of Remark 2), and an
additional critical – either stationary or inflection (depending onM and σ2p) – value otherwise.
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Table 1A. U.S. Treasury Bills: Summary Statistics
This table presents the mean and standard deviation for several variables in the GovPX database of transac-
tions in three-month, six-month, and one-year on-the-run and off-the-run Treasury bills between January 2, 1992
and December 29, 2000, their difference in means, and the correlation between daily yield and spread differen-
tials, ρ (∆Yt,∆St). End-of-day yields are in percentage, daily average bid-ask spreads are in basis points, and
amounts auctioned are in billions of U.S. dollars. A “ ∗ ”, “ ∗∗ ”, or “ ∗∗∗ ” indicates statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, or 1% level.
Off-the-Run On-the-Run Difference
Mean Stdev. Mean Stdev. in Mean
Three—Month
Daily yield x 100: Yt 5.166 0.606 5.193 0.609 -0.027
∗∗∗
Bid-ask spread x 10,000: St 0.291 0.240 0.120 0.067 0.171
∗∗∗
Convexity: Ct 0.0010 0.0001 0.0012 0.0001 -0.0002
∗∗∗
Duration: Dt 0.221 0.007 0.240 0.009 -0.019
∗∗∗
Total amount tendered 40.850 10.867
Total amount accepted 12.308 1.689




Daily yield x 100: Yt 5.388 0.578 5.402 0.581 -0.015
∗∗∗
Bid-ask spread x 10,000: St 0.260 0.172 0.130 0.057 0.130
∗∗∗
Convexity: Ct 0.0041 0.0005 0.0045 0.0004 -0.0004
∗∗∗
Duration: Dt 0.452 0.030 0.473 0.027 -0.021
∗∗∗
Total amount tendered 38.924 10.185
Total amount accepted 12.332 1.277




Daily yield x 100: Yt 5.381 0.758 5.406 0.755 -0.025
∗∗∗
Bid-ask spread x 10,000: St 0.275 0.168 0.110 0.047 0.165
∗∗∗
Convexity: Ct 0.010 0.003 0.012 0.003 -0.002
∗∗∗
Duration: Dt 0.789 0.164 0.892 0.147 -0.102
∗∗∗
Total amount tendered 47.086 11.855
Total amount accepted 17.266 2.056




Table 1B. U.S. Treasury Notes: Summary Statistics
This table presents the mean and standard deviation for several variables in the GovPX database of trans-
actions in two-year, five-year, and ten-year on-the-run and off-the-run Treasury notes between January 2, 1992
and December 29, 2000, their difference in means, and the correlation between daily yield and spread differen-
tials, ρ (∆Yt,∆St). End-of-day yields are in percentage, daily average bid-ask spreads are in basis points, and
amounts auctioned are in billions of U.S. dollars. A “ ∗ ”, “ ∗∗ ”, or “ ∗∗∗ ” indicates statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, or 1% level.
Off-the-Run On-the-Run Difference
Mean Stdev. Mean Stdev. in Mean
Two—Year
Daily yield x 100: Yt 5.483 0.888 5.489 0.882 -0.006
∗∗∗
Bid-ask spread x 10,000: St 0.017 0.005 0.008 0.002 0.009
∗∗∗
Convexity: Ct 0.040 0.001 0.044 0.001 -0.003
∗∗∗
Duration: Dt 1.763 0.035 1.842 0.034 -0.080
∗∗∗
Total amount tendered 41.802 6.341
Total amount accepted 18.300 1.844




Daily yield x 100: Yt 5.974 0.747 5.960 0.754 0.014
∗∗∗
Bid-ask spread x 10,000: St 0.030 0.009 0.014 0.004 0.016
∗∗∗
Convexity: Ct 0.204 0.010 0.214 0.007 -0.010
∗∗∗
Duration: Dt 4.110 0.113 4.223 0.087 -0.113
∗∗∗
Total amount tendered 30.679 3.736
Total amount accepted 12.914 1.830




Daily yield x 100: Yt 6.525 0.688 6.497 0.687 0.027
∗∗∗
Bid-ask spread x 10,000: St 0.054 0.014 0.024 0.005 0.030
∗∗∗
Convexity: Ct 0.596 0.027 0.641 0.033 -0.045
∗∗∗
Duration: Dt 6.824 0.203 7.106 0.244 -0.283
∗∗∗
Total amount tendered 30.676 4.244
Total amount accepted 13.385 2.093
Range of competitive bids: HLt 0.008 0.018
ρ (∆Yt,∆St) 0.055
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Table 2. Dispersion of Beliefs: Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for the 18MMS announcements in our sample (number of observations
and source) and the standard deviation across the corresponding professional forecasts (mean, standard deviation,
maximum, minimum, Spearman rank correlation with the Nonfarm Payroll standard deviation, ρ(Payroll), and
the first-order autocorrelation coefficient, ρ(1)). The sources are: Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Bureau of
the Census (BC), Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Federal Reserve Board (FRB), National Association of
Purchasing Managers (NAPM), Conference Board (CB), and Employment and Training Administration (ETA).
A “ ∗ ”, “ ∗∗ ”, or “ ∗∗∗ ” indicate the correlations’ significance at 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.
Obs. Source Mean Stdev. Max. Min ρ(Payroll) ρ(1)
Quarterly Announcements
1- GDP Advance 36 BEA 0.480 0.170 1.100 0.320 0.162∗ -0.181
2- GDP Preliminary 34 BEA 0.313 0.178 1.290 0.120 0.014 0.192
3- GDP Final 35 BEA 0.128 0.051 0.240 0.040 0.083 0.250
Monthly Announcements
Real Activity
4- Nonfarm Payroll 108 BLS 41.814 14.212 103.190 17.496 1.000 0.424∗∗∗
5- Retail Sales 107 BC 0.302 0.158 1.390 0.106 0.109 0.047
6- Industrial Production 107 FRB 0.183 0.135 1.700 0.087 0.236∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗
Consumption
7- New Home Sales 106 BC 19.270 10.235 96.225 7.840 0.151 0.099
Investment
8- Durable Goods Orders 106 BC 1.034 0.333 2.583 0.450 0.077 0.412∗∗∗
9- Factory Orders 105 BC 0.587 0.577 7.249 0.239 0.219∗∗ 0.015
10- Construction Spending 105 BC 0.499 0.253 1.270 0.158 0.176∗ 0.192∗∗∗
Net Exports
11- Trade Balance 107 BEA 0.790 0.851 11.480 0.400 0.122 0.018
Prices
12- Producer Price Index 108 BLS 0.130 0.049 0.380 0.060 0.186∗ 0.287∗∗∗
13- Consumer Price Index 107 BLS 0.086 0.051 0.580 0.040 0.146 0.221∗∗
Forward-Looking
14- Consumer Conf. Index 106 CB 1.646 0.609 4.026 0.663 0.079 0.230∗∗
15- NAPM Index 107 NAPM 0.961 0.303 2.680 0.441 0.242∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗
16- Housing Starts 106 BC 0.045 0.038 0.430 0.016 0.160 0.246∗∗∗
17- Index of Leading Ind. 108 CB 0.202 0.137 0.920 0.044 0.134 0.480∗∗∗
Weekly Announcements



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3. Information Heterogeneity and the Off/On-The-Run Bid-Ask Spread Differential
In this figure, we plot sums of coefficients βsh + βshi x 100 (solid line), βsm + βsmi x 100 (gray line), and
βsl + βsli x 100 (dotted line) from the estimation of the following regression model (Eq. (17)):
∆St = βsh ×Dht + βsl ×Dlt + βsm × (1−Dht −Dlt) + βs1(Dofft −Dont ) +
βs2(C
off








βsmiAuctiont−i × (1−Dht −Dlt) + εt
where∆St = S
off
t −Sont is the daily average off/on-the-run bid-ask spread differential,∆Dt = Dofft −Dont is
the off/on-the-run modified duration differential,∆Ct = C
off
t −Cont is the off/on-the-run convexity differential,
Auctiont−i is a dummy variable equal to one on day t if day t − i is the most recent auction date for the
corresponding bond and equal to zero otherwise, Dht (Dlt) is a dummy variable equal to one on days with high
(low) information heterogeneity, defined in Section 3.2 as days in which the monthly variable SSDPt of Eq. (11)
is above (below) the top (bottom) 70th (30th) percentile of its empirical distribution, and equal to zero otherwise,
and P = 18, for each of the bills and notes in our sample. We assume N = 4 for three-month and six-month
bills and N = 10 for all other bonds.
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